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Galanter v. Weber
DAVID A. WESTBROOKt

I too would like to thank the Mitchell Committee for
inviting me to participate in this year's program.
I really like the ambivalences in Marc's paper.1
Consider how ambivalently Marc treats the corporation. On
the one hand, he acknowledges that corporations make any
number of collective actions possible, and so life as he2
enjoys it-as we all enjoy it-presumes corporate activity.
On the other hand, the entire paper is structured around a
familiar antipathy to corporations, especially large corporations, an anxiety that is hardly the monopoly of left/liberal
types.
Marc also presents courts in ambivalent, indeed
competing, ways. First, the court is an arena in which two
relatively equal parties struggle in front of a neutral3
arbiter. Let's call this the adversarial model of the court.
Today, the adversarial model is under stress, however,
because corporations regularly turn up with bigger knights,
taller basketball players in Marc's example. 4 Therefore,
corporations on balance win more often than natural
persons. The adversarial contest seems, in some deep way,
to be unfair.
This structural imbalance gives rise to a second image
of courts, which we might call the administrative model. In
this model, the real purpose of the court system is to keep

t Professor of Law, University at Buffalo, State University of New York.
Thanks to Virginia E. Schmidt for her research assistance.
1. See Marc Galanter, Planet of the APs: Reflections on the Scale of Law and
its Users, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 1369 (2006).

2. Id. at 1370.
3. Id. at 1396.
4. Id. at 1396-97.
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things running smoothly, and at least roughly in accordance
5
with social policy, however that might be understood.
There is of course a third possibility, which seems very
real in the current political climate: courts might be made
unavailable for claims by natural persons against artificial
persons (APs), classic liberal litigation. There is a
still
growing-prejudice
considerable-and
probably
against such litigation and the plaintiffs bar that conducts
it. Marc, however, has spent a great deal of energy over the
years arguing that "too much litigation" is not a problem
confronting America. 6 So in this third model, courts are
rarely used by ordinary people. Let's call this the oligarchic
court model-you have to be rich, an oligarch, and usually
an artificial person, to afford judicial dispute resolution.
Marc uses the deep normative appeal of the adversarial
model of courts-our ideals of fair trial, equal access to
justice, and the idea that courts are places where society's
moral commitments are vindicated-as a basis from which
to mount a counterattack on the oligarchic court model. I do
not think-and I do not think Marc believes-that the
adversarial model can or even should prevail outright. Why
not?
Marc wants corporations in court. But as he has long
argued, there are structural reasons that corporations,
large bureaucratic organizations, are likely to be better at
litigation than individuals represented by law firms. 7 Thus,
the desire to get corporations in court compromises the
desire for the adversarial model. Moreover, if litigation
concerns the practices of large organizations, then such
litigation affects many people. This fact is only made
explicit by certifying a class of plaintiffs. But once litigation
is understood to be about a class of cases, and how policy
will work going forward, then litigation has come to

5. Id. at 1400-01.
6. See Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV.
3, 5 (1986); Marc Galanter, Predatorsand Parasites:Lawyer-Bashing and Civil
Justice, 28 GA. L. REV. 633, 652 (1994); Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An
Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1154 (1996).

7. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 95 (1979); see also IN LITIGATION:
DO THE 'HAVES' STILL COME OUT AHEAD? (Herbert M. Kritzer & Susan S. Silbey
eds., 2003).
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resemble legislation. 8 And legislation doesn't really fit the
adversarial model.
Thus, there is a bit of jujitsu in Marc's paper. We care
about the adversarial model of courts, natural persons
getting access to justice, but what we're really hoping to
get, as a practical matter, is more regulation of APs by
courts. And there has been some good news lately. After
Enron and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, courts are taking a
much more active role in the regulation of corporations.
But one might want to be cautious here, too. We've
heard a version of this story before. In fact, it is the story of
modern corporation law. During the last decades of the
nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth,
corporations played an increasing role in American life.
More businesses were organized as corporations, but more
importantly, some individual corporations grew into giants.
Corporations seemed to be taking over everything, not just
the legal system.
In 1932, two liberal intellectuals, Adolf Berle and
Gardiner Means, would brilliantly re-present this problem
in terms of the structure of the corporation. 9 This story is
historically problematic, as Gerald Berk has shown. 10 But
the story has a certain plausibility, internal logic, and even
truth. At any rate, it runs like this: the corporation is a way
of raising and organizing large amounts of capital, the
investments of vast numbers of shareholders who enjoy
limited liability. The business, however, cannot be run by
the owners, the investors, because there are so many of
them, and they are so spread out. Instead, the business is
run by a core of professional managers. In the famous
phrase, ownership of the modern corporation is separate
from control.11 The problem of corporation law as such,
then, is to bring corporations under control. And the
institution to do this would be the courts. Shareholders
should be given various rights against management so that
the performance of such duties would be judicially enforced.
8. Galanter, supra note 1, at 1396.
9. See

ADOLF

A. BERLE,

JR.

CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY

&

GARDINER

C.

MEANS,

THE

MODERN
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10. See generally GERALD BERK, ALTERNATIVE TRACKS: THE CONSTITUTION OF
1865-1917 (1994).

AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL ORDER,

11. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 9, at 118.
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The line of scholarship following Berle
and Means wanted
12
corporations in court, like Marc does.
Experience has shown that there are at least three
problems with the solution of enhanced judicial supervision
of corporations. First, it turned out that courts are not very
good at resolving many business conflicts. Shareholder
protection is rarely best achieved through litigation, which
is expensive.
Second, Berle and Means took little notice of a host of
marketplace-or strategic-modes of controlling managers.
Competition among managers,, the risk of takeovers,
executive compensation schemes, and the ability of
investors to sell into broad markets all serve to protect
shareholders, or at least adequately diversified shareholders. 13
Third, the separation of ownership and control is a
characterization of the relations between shareholders and
management, but that relation does not explain all of
corporate behavior. Most of the juicy law and policy stuff is
addressed through other areas of the law, broadly speaking,
regulation. Consider consumer protection or environmental
law, laws which regulate corporate activity, but from an
essentially external perspective.
Today, of course, after Enron and the collapse of the
Internet bubble, judicial oversight of business activity
seems more sensible than it has in a long time. Courts
again seem relatively good at disciplining companies.
Conversely, market mechanisms now seem to provide little
protection against abusive management. And while various
regulatory regimes will continue to regulate the external
activities of corporations, there is a lot more interest in
using corporation law to foster integrity in business
practice. At the same time, however, as memories of the
last few years fade and new opportunities, that is to say,
risks, present themselves, the newly rediscovered enthusiasm for judicial oversight of business activity may weaken,
indeed, may be weakening already.
12. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the
Century's Turn, 26 J. CORP. L. 737 (2001).
13. The locus classicus is Henry Manne's Market for Corporate Control.
Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL.
ECON'Y 110 (1965).
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So have we learned anything, or are we merely
traveling around in a circle? In order to address that
question, let's return to the basic ambivalence in Marc's
paper, whether corporations are good or bad. Corporations
and other APs are designed to accomplish some task, and
much of the time they do. This would seem to make
corporations, in general, good. But there is something
unsettling about artificiality-it is created by us, yet
somehow foreign to us. Marc compares the corporation to
Dr. Frankenstein's monster; 14 one might also mention the
golem of Jewish legend, a servant without a soul, who in
the end proves difficult to manage.
The common ambivalence over the corporation is a
species of the ambivalence with which I think most
thoughtful people confront modernization. So the question
that Marc's paper poses for me is whether his preferred
solution, the court, really addresses this ambivalence. And
here I am not so sure. I think courts tend to make things
more bureaucratic, not less, and therefore they are
unsettling and artificial in ways we associate with
corporations.
First, courts are not very good at substantive business
judgments. Courts, therefore, have adopted the business
judgment rule, that is, courts tend to defer to even very
wrong headed business judgments. 15 While the rule may be
sensible, it is difficult to see how a court that defers to
business decisions can relieve us of any ambivalence we
might feel about the process of corporate bureaucratization.
Second, as Marc points out, corporations as litigants
deploy their bureaucratic powers, which is what makes
them such good litigants. In order to oppose such powers,
one must adopt similar tactics-that is what class actions
and plaintiff side law firms do, they allow the plaintiffs side
to become as bureaucratic and formal as the defense's side.
Third, and more generally, law denaturalizes. The
adversarial notion of courts, in which lawyers are thought
to be "safeguarding just relationships and democratic

14. Galanter, supra note 1, at 1370.
15. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. 15452, 2005 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 113, at *150 (Del. Ch. 2005) (discussing the rationale for business
judgment rule).
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institutions,"16 is a heroic idealization. One of the things
that is lost in the idealization is that law is formal. Sandra
Jones becomes the plaintiff, who has certain rights, which
were violated by the actions of the defendant, etc. What we
teach in the first year of law school is this process of
denaturalization, of restating a particular human situation
in the formal language of the law. It is therefore a little
strange to speak, in the context of courts, of corporations in
contradistinction to natural persons. In an important way,
there are no natural persons in courts: there are plaintiffs,
defendants, lawyers, clients, judges, clerks, and witnesses.
Entering a court requires that one adopt such a predefined
role, and that thereby one becomes a part of the court as a
bureaucracy.
Fourth, and most problematically, courts impose
bureaucracy, and so exacerbate the problem. Lawyers, it
has been said, provide formal or procedural answers to
substantive questions. This is certainly true in the
corporate arena. In case after case, courts (and legislatures)
have addressed a failure of corporate governance by
requiring a procedure intended to prevent such failings in
the future. So, for example, faulty oversight leads to the
appointment of compliance officers, independent directors
on the audit committee, and a host of required paperwork. 17
Whether or not such efforts produce better accounting, they
definitely produce more bureaucracy.
Thus, while I am sympathetic to the notion that APs
are taking over the legal system, I do not think courts can
provide much of a solution. That said, and here I will
conclude, perhaps it is not too much to hope that courts can
ameliorate the situation. There is quite a lot to be said for
making even large organizations justify themselves in
public. The recent accounting trials are not just great
theater, they are instructive, and perhaps a bit humbling.

16. Galanter, supra note 1, at 1386 (quoting Gillian Hadfield, The Price of
Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV.
953, 998 (2000)).
17. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); In re
Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. 1996). See generally
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (to be codified in
scattered sections of 15, 18 U.S.C.).
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And maybe in that way, courts can make APs if not
more human, at least a bit more laughable.

